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 By MG John M. Curran

            In the last couple of months we have had the opportunity to review the information gathered during operations in Iraq, and we started analyzing the data for future doctrinal and training changes. Our Directorate of Training, Simulation and Doctrine is heading up the study for the Aviation Branch. Overall, the most fascinating aspect is reading about what was accomplished and how well our soldiers performed.  Here's an update from some of the material the Aviation Center is studying.     

OIF STUDY GROUP

            In April 2003 Army Chief of Staff GEN Eric K. Shinseki commissioned the Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group (OIFSG), led by BG Mark O'Neill from the Army G3 staff, with the mission to conduct a thorough review of U.S. forces in theater and evaluate their performance during combat operations. The OIFSG assessed the Army's contributions to the joint and coalition operations, and captured the strategic, operational and tactical lessons learned. 

            In support of this initiative, the U.S. Army Aviation Center provided three officers with attack, lift and maintenance backgrounds to review and study past and ongoing aviation operations. Each officer interviewed and discussed key aviation-related issues with leaders and soldiers throughout the theater.  In total, the OIFSG conducted more than 1,900 interviews with deployed service members. 

            Returning to Fort Leavenworth, Kan., in July, the team spent two weeks recreating the major combat operations by battlefield operating systems (BOS). The correlation of lessons by BOS presented a unique view, providing significant insight into how key battles unfolded and why leaders made certain decisions during the conduct of operations.

            It soon became apparent that most battles occurred under similar circumstances. Due to a vague enemy situation, friendly units were forced to conduct movements to contact in order to find and engage both regular and irregular enemy forces.

A Central Role

            Army aviation was central to the success of OIF through support provided not just to Army ground units, but also to joint and coalition forces.  From the onset of hostilities, Army aviation was overt — units conducted countless missions in support of ground units in contact or moving in tactical convoys, and moved personnel, equipment and supplies throughout the width and depth of the battlefield. 

            Aviation units also conducted missions independent of ground forces to destroy Iraqi military targets or positioned themselves so that they were able to support the maneuver forces. After major resistance was eliminated, Army aviation units occupied fixed bases and Army aircraft were the primary movers of critical supplies until a viable ground-transportation network was established.

            The OIF operating environment enabled Army aviation units to demonstrate the value of helicopters on a fast-moving and asymmetric battlefield. Ground units moved quickly to disrupt the enemy's decision cycle and prevent the establishment of an effective defense. The speed of the operation resulted in the fall of Baghdad, Saddam Hussein's center of gravity, in just 22 days. 

Missions

            Army aviation attack and cavalry units conducted reconnaissance and security, movement-to-contact, search-and-attack, and close-combat attack (CCA) operations in support of the rapid advance of the 3rd Infantry Division (3ID).  Army aviation lift and assault-helicopter units conducted air assaults; air movement of personnel, supplies and equipment; and insertion and extraction missions of soldiers at critical locations on the battlefield. Aviation units also supported the commitment of the V Corps reserve and conducted attacks against the Medina Division of Iraq's Republican Guard.

            Assault, lift and medical-evacuation units were invaluable to both the ground forces and other aviation units. These units conducted command-and-control and embedded personnel recovery missions; transported downed-aircraft-recovery teams; moved mission-essential equipment; conducted general support (GS) and medical-evacuation tasks; inserted and extracted long-range surveillance detachments; established forward arming and refueling points (FARP); and conducted air-assault operations and refuel missions known as "Fat Cow" (CH-47) and "Fat Hawk" (UH-60) operations. They also provided the quickest link to the logistical support bases in Kuwait during and after major combat operations in Iraq. 

OPERATIONS

            The following vignettes provide examples of the variety of aviation operations conducted during OIF.

 4th Brigade Combat Team (4th BCT), 3ID

            On March 20, the onset of the war, the 4th BCT as the division main effort — supported by the 3ID Division Artillery (DIVARTY) and aviation assets — conducted an observation post (OP) elimination mission that facilitated the movement of forces in Kuwait across the berm into Iraq. 

            At 1815Z, two attack-helicopter companies and a command-and-control UH-60L Black Hawk departed Camp Udairi, Kuwait, en route to destroy Iraqi OPs in support of the 3ID's breach and penetration of the Iraqi border. By 1830Z, the 4th BCT with the 3ID DIVARTY began executing a coordinated attack to destroy border OPs and two critical command posts (CPs). Fires began at 1850Z and nine of 11 targets, seven OPs and two CPs, were engaged and destroyed. The DIVARTY then shifted fires and destroyed the remaining two OPs with 36 artillery rounds per OP. AH-64Ds confirmed the destruction of the targets. Upon mission completion, all aircraft returned to Camp Udairi and began preparing for follow-on missions.

            Before noon on March 21 attack helicopters of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Avn. (1/3 Avn.), and seven UH-60Ls from 2/3 Avn. occupied a staging area at Jalibah Airbase in southern Iraq to prepare for shaping operations and CCA to destroy the Iraqi 11th Inf. Div..  Although the attack was initially planned for the following day, they executed the mission at 1700Z in support of 3rd BCT, 3ID. The result was the successful securing of the Highway 1 bridge over the Euphrates River at An Nasiriyah. During the next several days, 3ID aviation units supported the division's northward movement and Marine Corps units engaged in fighting at An Nasiriyah.

 3rd Squadron, 7th Cavalry (3/7 CAV)

            The OH-58D Kiowa Warrior (KW) aircraft proved very successful in conducting urban operations using CCA techniques. Once the war began, 3/7 Cav. used both of its air troops to conduct security missions forward in order to confirm the disposition of six bridge sites south of As Samawah. 

            Flying more than 100 kilometers in front of their ground troops, KW crews relied on FARP assets provided by UH-60 Fat Hawk aircraft. As ground cavalry troops moved forward near the bridge sites at As Samawah, OH-58Ds conducted CCA in and around the city, engaging ground targets while calling in both close air support and indirect fires. Coordinating with special operations units on the ground, 3/7 Cav. used KWs to locate and destroy a key enemy headquarters.

101st Airborne Division

            As 3ID moved north towards Baghdad, 101st Abn. Div. aviation units moved to terrain that was cleared by the movement of 3ID.  The mission of the 101st Abn. Div. aviation units was to get the 101st Avn. Brigade in position to attack the 14th Brigade of the Republican Guard's Medina Division and influence the battle of Baghdad.

            To do this, the brigade had to move nearly 400 kms. north of its staging base in Kuwait. Therefore, an intermediate refueling point and a FARP were required at the forward staging base. The 159th Avn. Bde. was tasked to establish rapid refuel point (RRP) Exxon and FARP Shell. Exxon was the intermediate RRP and Shell was the most northern FARP in the drive towards Baghdad. 

            The establishment of Exxon and Shell relied on integration between aviation units and ground forces. Both missions relied on the synchronization of convoys with the actions of supporting aviation assets. FARP teams composed of all elements of the 159th Avn. Bde. moved with forces from the 101st's Division Support Command and 101st Corps Support Group with attached ground forces until they reached their destinations. 

            Before the arrival of the FARP teams, the 3rd Bn., 187th Inf., was air assaulted more than 380 kms into FARP Shell to secure the objective. While the concept worked well, it was not without challenges, given the large volume of aircraft combined with a dusty environment. Although both FARPs were planned to be operational for a short period, Exxon remained operational for 17 days, while Shell was open for 12 days.

            During this operational phase, Shell became the staging base for AH-64s conducting deep shaping operations and CCAs.  As 3ID began to push north, the 101st was tasked to clear such major urban areas as Al Kifl, Al Hillah, Karbala and Mosul. Both aviation brigades supported the BCTs with air assaults, shaping operations and CCAs into these locations, with the final air assault into Mosul spanning more than 500 kms. Located not too far to the east, 3ID secured Objective Rams with a similar intent for its aviation assets.  Out of OBJ Rams, tactical assembly area (TAA) Vicksburg was established as home to the attack helicopters of V Corps's 11th Avn. Regt. 

11th Aviation Regiment

            On 23 March, the 11th Avn. Regt. conducted a cross-FLOT (forward line of troop) attack against the Medina Division, which resulted in almost every aircraft receiving some type of damage from small arms and air defense artillery.  While ingressing along the route, aircraft encountered an unexpected and sophisticated anti-aircraft ambush that prevented some crews from reaching their objectives.

            After this attack, senior 11th Avn. Bde. leaders conducted an after-action review (AAR) with the 101st Avn. Bde. and developed tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to counter this threat.  Four days later, the 101st Avn. Bde. flew 128 kms. across the FLOT against the same division and received damage to only one aircraft. The suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) plan prepped the route using Air Force close air support (CAS) and ATACMS (Army tactical missile system). 

            Once the aircraft departed the TAA, ATACMS fired again in a rolling barrage, landing two to four minutes in front of the aircraft along their route. If enemy contact was made along ingress, aircraft would conduct basic actions on contact by suppressing, deploying to cover away from the fire and then developing the situation. Crews would then engage stored targets with direct and indirect fires, continuously moving to increase aircraft survivability.

            Battle damage assessment (BDA) for both attacks was low, causing some critics to question the validity of shaping operations. But, in reality, the shaping operation accomplished its mission because it verified that the enemy was forced to disperse his assets across the battlefield, making him virtually useless against follow-on ground forces. It is also important to note that these and subsequent attacks showed the survivability of the Apache — it was able to take a hit and continue flying.              The 11th Avn. Regt.'s 2/6 Cav. did not execute the mission the night of March 23 and was placed under the operational control of 4th BCT in order to support 3ID's movement north. With two attack-helicopter battalions under its control, 4th BCT provided 24-hour CCA coverage as the division maneuvered north through the Karbala Gap towards Baghdad.

            Following 3ID's movement north, the 101st Abn. Div. tasked OH-58D and AH-64 crews to support ground forces in order to clear cities block by block. Using an inner-ring/outer-ring concept, Apaches covered key avenues of approach on the perimeter of the city while OH-58Ds flew in the center area searching for pockets of resistance.  This technique provided the ground commander greater flexibility by allowing him to focus his combat power on the intended objective.  These TTPs also leveraged CAS and indirect fires by ensuring enlisted terminal attack controllers (ETAC), air-liaison officers, fire-support officers and forward air controllers (airborne) were integrated on every mission.

LESSONS LEARNED

            When describing Iraq's fielded military forces, MAJ David J. Rude, S3 operations officer of 1st Bn., 3rd Avn., stated: "The Iraqis tucked their conventional weapon systems into their city blocks among family dwellings and behind human shields. We were not fighting tanks in this war. Apaches were not sent after division artillery groups in engagement areas because they were not arrayed as such." 

            Facing an enemy differing from that envisioned in prewar intelligence briefings, warfighter computer exercises or the collective experience gained during Operation Desert Storm, aviation units were forced to adapt quickly to an asymmetric battlefield. 

            Many of the successes achieved in OIF are attributed to lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom, where the term CCA was codified. Attack and cavalry units in OIF quickly realized the significance of dynamic engagements by using running and diving modes of fire in order to maintain survivability on the battlefield. Target handovers between air and ground forces became standardized, with both elements emphasizing the importance of understanding marking methods of both friendly and enemy locations. This positive transfer of TTP allowed Army aviation units to support the ground commander with responsive direct fires. 

            Air-ground integration is much more than attack and cavalry aviation units supporting ground elements in contact. Lift and assault units are integrated with ground elements when they conduct air assaults, move personnel, supplies or equipment, or provide command-and-control assets to units on the ground during engagements or tactical convoys. Air-ground integration also occurs when ground elements are attached to aviation units to be used as door gunners or security elements for base security, personnel recovery teams and downed aircraft recovery teams.

            The 159th Avn. Bde. received 136 door gunners from the BCTs of the 101st Abn. Div. The soldiers were designated before the deployment and received 40 hours of training focused on aviation operations. The attachment of door gunners benefited maintenance by allowing one crew chief to fly with the helicopter on a mission. The remaining crew chiefs were used to conduct maintenance on aircraft that remained and in the assembly area — this facilitated the execution of "launch, recover and launch again."

            The fluid battlefield revealed that the execution of many air missions is event-based where air and ground operations are integrated. The establishment of RRP Exxon and FARP Shell were tied to the movement of ground elements. Aircraft from the 159th Avn. Bde. carrying the security elements were launched so that they would arrive ahead of the ground elements to facilitate the establishment of the FARPs. Also, the movement of personnel and equipment to OBJ Rams to support the deep attack conducted by the 11th Avn. Regt. was contingent upon the area being cleared by 3ID and the anticipated arrival of the 1-227th Avn. FARP ground convoy. 

            The utilization of the events-based operations places a premium on accurate and timely Blue Force information. Leaders require visibility of the status of trigger events and the ability to communicate with elements waiting for the trigger conditions to be met. Blue Force Tracker (BFT) was used successfully during Operation Iraqi Freedom to accomplish the task of transmitting the location of aircraft and text messages. Decision makers received updates and issued execution orders using BFT. Also, aviation used BFT to transmit special instructions (SPINS) to the aircrews that were separated from their parent units.

SUMMARY

            Army aviation was essential to the battle plan of OIF due to the versatility, speed and effectiveness aviation formations bring to the battlefield. Aviation provided ground commanders with options that translated into flexible operations. Speed and lethality were the keys to preventing the Iraqi leaders and military from establishing an effective defense. Assault and lift aviation units rapidly moved soldiers and equipment to critical points and then sustained those units. Attack and cavalry units supported ground elements and conducted independent operations to locate enemy formations and reduce their combat effectiveness. 

            Once major combat operations ended and stability operations began, the versatility of Army aviation was very important. Attack and cavalry units conducted security operations while lift and assault units took on the task of moving supplies and repair parts.   

            Hats off to the men and women of Army aviation who served and continue to serve on operations as part of the joint and combined arms team. And hats off to the team that has worked so diligently to collect observations and insights that will help us improve our aviation contribution to warfighting, now and in the future.

            Think safety and risk management always, be safe and watch out for others. Above the Best!

   "Above the Best!"

 MG John M. Curran is the commander of the U.S. Army Aviation Center and chief of the aviation branch.